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Abstract: Immediately after the outbreak of the First World War Germany mobilized hu-
man resources from all fields and put up all the necessary funds to counter British and 
French propaganda. In a very short period of time, it was in a position to organize its 
own propaganda networks abroad, to a large extent, by using the respective commercial 
networks and the pre-war enterprises operating in various countries. It was the neutral 
countries around the world that were among the primary targets of German propaganda. 
In the Balkans particular effort was made to create a favourable climate for the Central 
Powers and prevail over the adverse British and French influence. With the assistance of 
commercial circles and the appropriation of large sums of money, newspapers, journalists 
and publishing groups were bought off, information offices set up, agents recruited, politi-
cal parties and politicians bribed, and pro-German parties founded. The aim was to influ-
ence public opinion, promote the German version of war developments, and manipulate 
political leaders to give up their stance of neutrality and make the decision for their coun-
try to take part in the war on the side of Germany. However, even though Berlin focused 
its attention on the Balkans where the major propaganda networks were organized, the 
propaganda campaigns proved to be essentially ineffective. Following Bulgaria’s entry into 
the war on the side of the Central Powers and the destruction of Serbia, first Romania and 
then Greece joined the Entente, finding themselves on the winning side at the war’s end.
Keywords: German propaganda, German Foreign Ministry, neutrality, Greece, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, newspapers, Freiherrn Garl Schenck von Schweinsberg, Ludwig Roselius, Agen-
tia Romana-Germana de Informatii, public opinion
It was immediately after the outbreak of the war, and because of the vilifying way the British Consulate in Constantinople had portrayed the German na-
val defeat, that Berlin realized, uneasily, the enemy had already formed the orga-
nizational basis for its propaganda presentation of the war to European public 
opinion and, in particular, to the neutral countries. It was, therefore, imperative 
that Germany use the same means, as soon as possible, in order to counteract the 
campaign of “false information” and “slander” which the British had launched.1 
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1 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts [hereafter PA AA], R 20936: Wangenheim(;) an 








Commercial circles stressed the need to radically alter the prevailing view that 
German diplomacy was unable to refute British claims of atrocity.2
For a coordinated German propaganda campaign that would literally 
have worldwide effect, it was necessary to establish a unified operational centre 
based in Berlin but with the Middle East as its focal point. This was not only for 
the sake of the battle for the “soul of the Middle East” but also, and more impor-
tantly, for conducting the war, and for defending vital economic interests in the 
Ottoman Empire. It was a golden opportunity for the Germans to strike a blow 
to the British Empire. In this way, they would be able to force it to agree to peace 
talks in order to relieve pressure that it would be facing from the uprisings of its 
Muslim subjects in India and Egypt.3
Of course, Germany and its ally, the Sultan, would help instigate the 
rebellion. However, for this to happen, certain conditions were necessary: or-
ganization, the mobilization of all available means and resources, realistic mili-
tary plans, and operational propaganda which would present Germany to these 
populations as a defender against the enemy, as a crusader of honour and truth 
and as a supporter of self-determination. The support of the Turkish govern-
ment at all costs and the preservation of their common goals had, thus, become 
fundamental to fulfilling German political and military plans in the East.4
It was a given fact that the German press would be used to publish and 
distribute military commentary and news reports to all European countries, 
which would then be translated for press outlets in Africa and the Middle East. 
The publication of German press releases in the newspapers of the region, the 
bribing of journalists and publishers, in fact the buying off of entire publishing 
houses, also meant the involvement of the local embassy and consular authori-
ties, the recruitment of suitable agents, as well as the allocation of the neces-
sary funds. An entire body comprising translators, teachers (both German and 
natives) from the seminar for the East in Berlin and from the Institute for the 
Colonies in Hamburg would staff these places.5
People from every position, field and profession were called to contribute 
to the success of the German international propaganda campaign: bankers and 
representatives of large merchant houses abroad, Baghdad railway staff, Ger-
man schools and Christian missionaries, members of the Jewish communities, 
2 PA AA, R 20936: Verband Deutscher Handlungsgehilfen zu Leipzig an das Ministerium 
des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin), Mannheim, 19 August 1914.
3 PA AA, R 20936: Wangenheim (;) an Reichskanzler Freicherrn von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Berlin, 18 August 1914.
4 PA AA, R 20936: Wangenheim (;) an Reichskanzler Freicherrn von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Berlin, 18 August 1914.
5 PA AA, R 20936: Wangenheim (;) an Reichskanzler Freicherrn von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Berlin, 18 August 1914.
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exiles and foreign communities in Europe, in the East and in America. Members 
of independence movements, inter alia, constituted the manpower behind the 
counterpropaganda, as well as being responsible for active propaganda, which 
– wherever needed – rerouted public opinion and strengthened pro-German 
sentiments in order to gain new supporters.6
The incitement and the steady feeding of the pan-Islamist movement 
with ideas, weapons, men and money as a way to force England into a peace 
agreement; the instigation of an insurrection in Russia by its Muslim and Jew-
ish populations; the exploitation of independence movements such as the Irish, 
were all actions which represented one element of the German counterattack 
against the allegations made by its enemies. The other element consisted of 
comprised the need to fortify the military camp of the Central Powers by brow-
beating the neutral countries into the war, or to quote: “In every neutral country, 
we must have our agents, who will have won the trust of the country and its 
people, so that a favourable stance towards us is formed. This too is a service to 
the fatherland.”7
The main objective was for all to contribute to the fatherland in order to 
deal swiftly with the enemy who had the upper hand in the propaganda game. 
In this, the role of the German entrepreneurs and business giants was decisive 
for providing the capital and the networks abroad. Persil, Henkel, Odol, Maggi, 
among others, with an advertising turnover of about 30 to 50 million marks a 
year, received a proposition from the Foreign Ministry to participate on a com-
mittee to help national propaganda that would establish and fund propaganda 
networks in the form of war offices of information.8
For anyone who might have had doubts about the connection between 
advertising and propaganda,9 the Foreign Ministry had plenty of suggestions 
from prominent entrepreneurs about the organization of propaganda on busi-
ness bases. Here, the key was to understand the psychology of the masses and 
6 PA AA, R 20936: Wangenheim (;) an Reichskanzler Freicherrn von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Berlin, 18 August 1914.
7 PA AA, R 20936: Verband Deutscher Handlungsgehilfen zu Leipzig an das Ministerium 
des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin), Mannheim, 19 August 1914.
8 PA AA, R 20937: Ludwig Roselius an Unterstaatssekretär Zimmermann, Berlin, 5 Janu-
ary 1915. The instigator of the proposal, a merchant himself and owner of the firm Kaffee-
Handels-Aktiengesellschaft, with its headquarters in Bremen, was the mastermind behind 
German propaganda in the Balkans, organizing a wide-ranging network based in Bucharest.
9 Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda, trans. Dimitris Tannis (Athens: Nefeli Publishing, 2015). 
Bernays, a member of the Wilson government’s Committee on Public Information during 
the First World War, realized early on that the mechanisms of control and manipulation of 
public opinion could likewise be implemented during peacetime. Adapting his knowledge of 
advertising, he was the initiator of the women’s smoking campaign: cigarettes as beacons of 
freedom were directly associated with women’s emancipation.
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the mechanisms of persuasion, which created the belief in the masses that they 
were not forced into anything but that whatever they adopted corresponded 
fully to their beliefs and was in their best interest. By adopting the practices of 
advertising, marketers and entrepreneurs had the tools to point out rule number 
one to the politicians, which was none other than the total identification of poli-
tics and business interests with propaganda. And for anyone who was concerned 
about the principles of promoting propaganda, the businessmen had a ready 
answer was simple and to the point: “The foundations of propaganda are lies, 
defamation and immorality.”10
The main propagandist of German interests in Greece did indeed come 
from the business world. Freiherrn Carl Schenck von Schweinsberg, better 
known as Baron Schenck, had already been living in Athens as the represen-
tative of Krupp when the war broke out. This event forced him to stop nego-
tiations with the Greek government for the purchase of four submarines, a 
battleship and ammunition, and for Krupp to terminate its cooperation with 
him abroad.11 Although the company expected him to return to head office, it 
received a notice from the Foreign Ministry that the Krupp employee would 
now be engaged by the Embassy in Athens, responsible for Press matters and 
other intelligence issues.12
Without a doubt, of decisive importance was his association with the 
Greek royal couple, while he was already doing an excellent job on propaganda 
in the Greek press. Soon Baron Schenck’s room at the Hotel Grande Bretagne 
was transformed into an informal press office and propaganda centre, which he 
staffed with Greek agents in collaboration with the secret police. Proof that Ger-
man money intended for propaganda purposes, handled by the then ambassador 
through bank transfers from Berlin to accounts with the Greek National Bank, 
had been put to good use was the sudden pro-German turnaround of certain 
newspapers in the Greek capital, which indicated their having been bought off.13
10 PA AA, R 20937: Ludwig Roselius, “Ein Kapitel über Organisation”, Bremen [Ludwig 
Roselius an Baron Langwerth von Simmern, Berlin, 6 January 1915].
11 PA AA, R 7465: Various documents. For the last attempts made by German industry 
for market share gain over its competitors of the Greek arms market before war broke out 
and the role of Schenck as Krupp’s representative in Athens see Kostas Loulos, The German 
policy in Greece, 1896–1914, trans. Katerina Liaptsi (Athens: Cultural Institute of Agricultural 
Bank of Greece, 1990), 200–212.
12 PA AA, R 19891 (Weltkrieg vom 20 August 1914): K. Gesandte (Quadt) an Auswärtiges 
Amt, no. 345, Athens, 20 August 1914 and R 7465: Friedrich Krupp, Aktiengesellschaft, an 
das Auswärtige Amt, no. 1776, Essen/Ruhr, 26 August 1914.
13 Stratos Dordanas, “This traitor should not have survived the attempt of June 21st: Anti-
venizelism and German Propaganda in Greece of the National Schism”, in 1915–2015: 100 
years since the National Schism, Conference, Municipality of Argos/Mycenae-Philologists 
Association of Argolis, Cultural Centre of the Municipality of Argos/Mycenae, Argos, 7–8 
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The German Embassy in Athens became the centre for propaganda, 
where an entire operation funded by Berlin was set up. The main objective of 
the propaganda mechanism was to buy off Greek newspapers and journalists, 
and use them to promote German interests by influencing public opinion. There 
were newspapers, which after being bought off by the embassy, changed their 
political line completely; from being pro-Entente, they overnight became pro-
German. Likewise, there were journalists who were paid to publish the Ger-
man General Staff ’s communiqués. In the propaganda war in neutral Greece, 
competition between the Entente and the Central Powers was fierce. Both rival 
alliances sought to win the country over to their side and steer public opinion by 
disseminating what was often censored information about the war. In particular, 
the large amounts of money spent by Germany for this purpose revealed the 
importance attached to this tactic. German propaganda very quickly made up 
the top news in Greece, raising a major political and ethical issue in the spheres 
of journalism and politics.14
However, Greece was not at the centre of German designs because the 
country had already been won over when the Greek king, from the outbreak of 
the war, showed a commitment to benevolent neutrality. The only assurance that 
he needed was not to be left entirely without help should difficulties arise. If, in 
the same period, one looks just a little further north, more exactly at Bucharest, 
one can see millions of German marks being made available for specific pur-
poses, including the purchase of the Romanian grain production, and the buying 
off of newspapers and leading political figures, all this in order to overturn the 
country’s neutrality from the outset of the war.
Recruited from the very beginning of the war, Ludwig Roselius, a re-
nowned merchant from Bremen, zealously set up the propaganda machine in 
Bucharest, which extended all the way to Sofia, and which was continually sup-
plied with millions of German marks, a part of which was financed from the 
respective government coffers in Vienna. To be able to do this implies that the 
political contacts needed to prepare the ground had already been made. Having 
received German assurance that after the end of the war Romania would get 
Bessarabia, King Carol informed Roselius that in the event of Bulgaria attacking 
Serbia, Romania would not intervene. In response, the German propagandist 
November 2015 (in press). By the same author: “In the German Embassy: diplomatic agents 
and invisible key players of German Politics and Propaganda”, in Aspects of the First World 
War in the Balkan Peninsula, Workshop, Hellenic National Defence General Staff/Hellenic 
Committee on Military History, Thessaloniki, 7 October 2017. 
14 On this issue see Despina Papadimitriou, “The Press and the Schism, 1914–1917” (PhD 
thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 1990); also (Sir) Basil Thomson, 
The Allied Secret Service in Greece (in Greek) (Athens: Logothetis Publishing) (English origi-
nal, London: Hutchinson, 1931).
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explained that his mission was not directed against the dynasty or the state, 
but rather at winning the very best of the Romanian people for the German 
cause. What exactly was the German cause? With the participation of North-
ern Europe and the Balkans, except Serbia, Germany continued to fight for the 
creation of the United States of Europe as a shield against Russian and English 
aggression. In this union, all peoples would have equal rights regarding educa-
tion, religion and ethnicity; furthermore, the inviolability of the dynasties would 
be assured.15
On receiving the king’s indirect approval, Roselius put to use the people 
at his disposal who had sound knowledge of Romanian reality, and wasted no 
time in taking control of certain newspapers; he not only acquired entire pub-
lishing groups but also bought off top politicians. The attainment of these objec-
tives was actually based on a very simple but effective reasoning: by paying more 
for the grain than its real value, access was automatically granted to Romanian 
markets, and to the political offices as well.16
 With Take Ionescu’s son-in-law playing a key role in many of these trade 
agreements, it did not take long for the politician and his party, the Conservative 
Democrats, to join the ranks of neutrality, although at first he was strongly in 
favour of the Entente. Proud of its significant achievements in Romania, Berlin 
acknowledged that this practice brought the best results; to quote: “We gain the 
trust of those behind the ministers, who eventually succumb to the pressure of 
their own people. In order not to buy off Ionescu directly, even though he badly 
wants it, we use his people. [...] There are many incompetents who maintain re-
lations with ministers and party leaders, to whom we daily give a few thousand 
leu, asking them for something in return. This is how we gain adherents on a 
daily basis.”17
The press was the main instrument for influencing public opinion in Bu-
charest18 and Sofia (40 million was the amount spent for buying off the news-
papers Ziua, Minerva and Seara), which were constantly fed with news reports 
15 PA AA, R 21196: “Unterredung Roselius mit Seiner Majestät dem König”, Bucharest, 6 
September 1914 [Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Rumänien an dem Reichskanzler 
Freicherrn von Bethmann-Hollweg, no. 267, Bucharest, 7 November 1914.]
16 PA AA, R 21196: Kaiserlich Deutsches Konsulat an das Auswärtige Amt, no. 1–8, Bucha-
rest, 26 September 1914.
17 PA AA, R 21196: Kaiserlich Deutsches Konsulat an das Auswärtige Amt, no. 1–8, Bucha-
rest, 26 September 1914.
18 Ibid. no. 9: “Reading a Romanian newspaper one gets the impression that the Germans 
and the Austrians are defeated daily, that in these countries there is starvation, that the Ger-
mans are destroying cultural monuments, that our Kaiser can be compared only with Attila 
and many other such things. One can talk with serious and educated people and realize their 
certainty that the Hindenburg army has achieved not even a small victory, that the German 
and Austrian army have not had a single victory in this war”.
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from the News Office, Agentia Romana-Germana de Informatii. Along with 
politicians willing to be bribed,19 this resulted in the establishment of a small 
Germanophile party that was also in need of financial assistance in order to 
win more supporters from the wider society.20 In Romania, the Germans used 
agents from Jewish circles for the purposes of propaganda and espionage, being 
impressed by their honesty and credibility.21 After all, the recruitment of agents 
was one of the responsibilities of the News Office.22
Furthermore, the German-Romanian News Office played a key coordi-
nating role because, on the one hand, it controlled the newspapers that had been 
bought off, and, on the other, it promoted the publication of news on the war 
depicting events in a decidedly pro-German light. It also published brochures, 
maps and cards of Bessarabia, which had a sentimental effect on the Roma-
nians. With the help of a telegraph network, information arrived from the war 
correspondents on the battlefields, which was then sent to the embassy and the 
consulates for processing in order to end up in the newspapers. The Agentia Ro-
mana-Germana de Informatii was so successful that besides the Bucharest office, 
there were plans to establish branches in Constantinople and Sofia.23 Towards 
this end, contact was made with the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Radoslavov 
himself, as well as his influential circles. Bulgarian participation was agreed in 
the form of a joint Romanian-Bulgarian committee that for propaganda pur-
poses would travel to Berlin, as well as to the battlefields; it would send press 
releases to Bucharest and Sofia, as well as distribute propaganda to other neutral 
countries.24
19 The most important politicians in Romania were Ion I. C. Brãtianu and Emil Costinescu 
(former director of Banca Generala Romana/Berliner Diskonto-Gesellschaft). Brãtianu sup-
ported the king’s political stance, which was completely pro-German, while Costinescu, who 
was a former newspaper editor and came from a poor background, became one of the richest 
people in Romania with the assistance of German capital and due to the support he provided 
for business deals between the two sides. It is well known that in Romania the cabinet min-
isters had invested their capital in industry, as did Costinescu, whose main investments were 
in the sugar industry, with which his entire family were involved. As finance minister and 
responsible for the economic policy-making of the state, his continued backing of German 
interests, with personal economic gain, was considered a foregone conclusion. That is why, 
despite his age and weak health, the Germans had decided to make use of him.
20 PA AA, R 21196: Kaiserlich Deutsches Konsulat an das Auswärtige Amt, no. 5, Bucha-
rest, 26 September 1914.
21 PA AA, R 21196: Kaiserlich Deutsches Konsulat an das Auswärtige Amt, no. 7, Bucha-
rest, 26 September 1914.
22 PA AA, R 21196: Ludwig Roselius, “Deutsche Propaganda-Rumänien”.
23 PA AA, R 21196: Ludwig Roselius, “Deutsche Propaganda-Rumänien”.
24 PA AA, R 21196: Kaiserlich Deutsches Konsulat an das Auswärtige Amt, no. 12, Bucha-
rest, 26 September 1914.
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To make sure that the propaganda machine in Romania and Bulgaria 
would continue to operate even under the most adverse conditions Roselius 
bought large quantities of paper in the event that the overseas supply was sus-
pended. Under his orders, agents were ready to sabotage the publication of 
printed matter that was hostile to the Central Powers, and organize trade union 
protests and peasant demonstrations in support of “peace” and the king.25
Two Bulgarians that had been bought off had the task of sending pro-
German accounts to the Bulgarian press. One was a priest, who received fund-
ing for his church, and the other was a correspondent who received a healthy 
check.26 In turn, the Chief of Police of Ruse in Bulgaria banned the circulation 
of all non-Germanophile newspapers.27 His agreement with the Chief of Police 
in Sofia was to arrest anyone involved in actions against the government’s stance 
of neutrality. Having previously received the money agreed on, some newspaper 
editors of the Bulgarian press were willing to publish news items given to them 
directly by the German and Austrian consulates.28
What did the Germans think about Romanian society and the reading 
public? And how did they present the buying off of newspapers to promote 
their propaganda? According to Roselius and his superiors in Berlin: “In times 
of peace, a newspaper can simply serve the economic and commercial interests 
of Germany. But in these crucial moments that we are living in, a newspaper 
under German control and serving German interests, can, under the right con-
ditions, produce the same effects as our army, with substantially fewer losses.”29 
The Romanian newspapers that had been bought off had, therefore, to adapt 
their contents according to the instructions of their new employers, as well as 
the needs of their readers.
German comments regarding the readers were not very flattering: “The 
Romanian reading public likes sentimentality and lies; they do not want to learn 
the truth of the events, but in the spirit of battle and the rattling of the machine 
guns, they want to see blood flow. This is not only the case in Romania but in 
every place where newspapers are sold on the street like, for example, in Paris, 
Copenhagen, et cetera. This type of press depends on the nation and on state 
lobby groups. At this late moment, for the Reich to be able to compete with Rus-
sia and France, it is necessary to make money available – in no case does it need 
to be the high amounts that the enemy is spending – but it needs to offer money 
25 PA AA, R 21196: Kaiserlich Deutsches Konsulat an das Auswärtige Amt, no. 14, Bucha-
rest, 26 September 1914.
26 PA AA, R 21196: “Bericht”, 17/30 September 1914.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 PA AA, R 21196: (Ludwig Roselius;) Bericht no. 6, “Angelegenheit Universul”, Bucharest, 
9 October 1914.
http://www.balcanica.rs
S. N. Dordanas, German Propaganda in the Balkans during the First World War 77
that ends up in the pockets of journalists [journalistischer Strauchdiebe] so as to 
prevent further sacrifices in German blood and materials.”30
Ultimately, just how this huge amount of money and the well-organized 
structure connecting Berlin to Bucharest and Sofia, including Athens, contrib-
uted to fulfilling German pursuits, was clearly demonstrated by the subsequent 
political and military developments in the Balkans. Bulgaria, after having se-
cured promises of territorial concessions against Serbian and Greek Macedo-
nia, and the granting of a loan, took part in the Central Powers’ autumn attack 
against Serbia,31 whereas Romania entered the war in August 1916 on the side 
of the Entente.32 At around the same time, in Greece, the conflict between King 
Constantine and the Anglo-French supported by the former Prime Minister 
Venizelos, split the country in two and soon led to open warfare, taking on the 
character of a civil war.33
To conclude, in any event, German propaganda against the neutral coun-
tries in the Great War was based on the words of Otto von Bismarck, and that 
meant using every available means to get across the German version of the 
“truth” on the war. This “truth” must, of course, be read as “lies” which is told 
by hunters and politicians especially during elections, and – as in our case – by 
propagandists during war.
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